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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR. MACH
AND MS. ANDERSON
QUESTION, MR. LAYTON: The maritime provinces have a very dif-
ferent position in this dispute because they have mostly private wood lot
land. How does the federal government deal with the different views of the
provinces from British Columbia on one end to the Maritime Provinces on
the other? The Maritime Provinces feel there is not the same case against
them as there is against other provinces. How does the federal government
from Canada deal with that?
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: On this point, I want to disagree with Mr.
Mach. He suggested that in the negotiations of the softwood lumber agree-
ment in 1996 was probably harder on the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) negotiating with each province then it was with anyone else. Non-
sense, it is a divide and conquer strategy. If the provinces want the best out-
come, they have to quit negotiating separately. That is my particular personal
view.
QUESTION, MR. JONSHON: It seems to me this coalition seems to be
able to get the U.S. Government to do things they basically hate to be doing,
for example, the export taxes just before the Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
came into effect, they got the Canadian Government to impose an export tax
on softwood lumber, and they turned around and the FTA prohibited export
taxes because they were probably quite rightly so enraged at the export tax
they were charging on oil.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), or at
least the Safeguards Agreement, has a prohibition on Voluntary Restraint
Agreements (VRA) and yet you have' the Softwood Lumber Agreement
(SLA) negotiated as a VRA. The coalition just seems to have incredible
clout with the U.S. Government. One would have thought that the U.S. in-
terest was to get Canadian resources cheap, and not have them cost too much
and here, they cost more than they should. Could you just give some of the
political dynamic why these guys have this extraordinary clout that other
groups do not seem to have in the U.S. and bend the U.S. Government into
doing things that I do not think the U.S. Government on principle would like
to do?
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: I do not think the Canadian softwood
lumber should feel singled out. They are one of the primary targets of a
group. It is not an industry, by the way. It is a piece of the U.S. industry that
remains willing to pay big bucks for big lobbying.
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The steel industry remains willing to do that. There are a few others who
are willing to do that; and when you are willing to lobby very strongly for
something in the U.S. system, you are likely to get enough Congressional
pressure on an administration that they will do things that they do not want to
do.
That is what happens. I think, actually, the current petitions are very in-
teresting that the effort of these petitions seems to be more on the lobbying
front than on the evidence. I mean it may have been the conclusion that if
they could just get enough Senators to say, "We are for this," then the case
would go forward and that will intimidate Canada into another five years or
how many other years of protection for the U.S. industry.
QUESTION, MR. ROBINSON: Do you think there is any real prospect
for getting eminent persons to work on this dispute, to get that process of
resolution going?
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: That is a question that I cannot really
answer. I mean that discussion has been completely between the Canadian
Government and the U.S. Government. Lawyers like me have not been en-
gaged on that.
I would add, from a personal perspective, there is an odd thing that goes
on in Canada and that is that people say, "We have got to convince the U.S.
Government that we want free trade in lumber." That kind of misses one big
piece of the picture, which is that the U.S. Government might think free trade
in lumber would be just fine. What does free trade in lumber mean?
The fact is that the U.S. and Canada, and every other country you can
think of,, has trade remedy laws and those laws give industries the right to
bring cases. So then the question is, will the cases be administered in a way
that is fair so that if there is really not an unfair trade problem, that will be
the answer. People talk about talking to USTR about getting free trade in
lumber, and USTR could not promise anybody free trade in lumber if they
were the last people on earth. They simply do not have the authority to do
that.
I am not sure this is related to the envoy question, but it is a little bit re-
lated to envoy. The idea of the envoy is fundamentally a good one if you had
good faith on both sides of the border to look at the area of North American
lumber issues on both sides of the border, and see what is going on here, be-
cause it is not a one side of the border issue.
On the U.S. side of the border, they have a major supply problem because
supply has been cut back on the national side of the forest. I happen to be for
that as an American who likes forests and does not want them cut down.
They have a supply problem in the Pacific Northwest, in part, due to that.
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 27 [2001], Iss. , Art. 50
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol27/iss/50
Mach & Anderson-DISCUSSION
The southern producers are probably worried because, any day now, the
environmentalists who have been getting in bed with the U.S. coalition soft-
wood lumber case from Canada one of these days are going to turn their
sights on the U.S. south and say, "Why does the U.S. South have no envi-
ronmental requirements on timber production and timber lands?" The U.S.
South knows that is coming. I mean they have to know attention is coming
in the south; and so they are worried about in the U.S. the ability to produce
softwood lumber and stay competitive. It is a big set of problems in the U.S.,
and that is only one of these sets of problems. Canadian producers have a set
of problems that people of real good faith could sit down in a room and dis-
cuss those things without a political agenda, and without a negotiation
agenda, maybe something would be learned, but I do not think we are there.
QUESTION, MR. TENNANT: You have painted the short-term picture.
The assumption is this can play out for a very long time. You are unlikely to
be able to predict where the Bush Administration might be in two years or
four years, I am wondering what are some of the longer term factors about
the free trade credentials of the new administration, how should Canadians
develop their expectations for the types of things you are saying are not ap-
parent yet?
Beyond softwood lumber, Canada has been faced with the short-term is-
sues you have cited. They have to build some constituency for their agenda
to move on various things, might they become a seriously principled admini-
stration over two years, three years, might they show more ability to stand up
to some of the special interests and political pressures in the U.S.?
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: Well, at minimum, they would stand up
to interests.
I think there is some chance of a fundamental principled idea of trade
liberalization, a focus on trade negotiations, very strategically designed to
give the U.S. leadership and look out for U.S. interests. This is not altruism.
No government is purely altruistic, although, I believe, any government
in this day and age that looks broadly at trade liberalization has to look at it
in terms of what does it do for the entire world, and that means very much
what does it do for developing countries and so on.
I want to say it is self-interested, but self-interested means much broader.
I think it is quite possible, if not reasonably likely, that this government, this
administration, might get there. I think they are headed toward trying to get
trade promotion authority in order to negotiate, you know, more openness,
and with that will go things that are good for the rest of world and not only
the U.S.
How soon they succeed, is another issue. They have to get over the labor
and environment question. One of the ironies of life is that in the North
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, Canada said we
will not have trade sanctions for trade and environmental issues, labor and
environment, and Canada negotiated this very special set of fines. They
could be fined, but they could not have trade sanctions; and, suddenly, that
has become a possible solution in the U.S. context for dealing with labor and
the environment, although the idea for that is now being credited to any
number of U.S. Congressmen.
QUESTION, MR. POTTER: I should disclose a conflict before I ask the
question. I represent the Quebec softwood lumber industry.
Before asking my question, which is for both of the panelists, I think it is
worth mentioning a point which was raised by Mr. Mach, and I fear that
some people in the audience might have concluded by your comments that
the softwood lumber agreement capped exports from all of Canada, and that
is not the case.. It only capped exports from four provinces as, of course, you
know.
In fact, exports from other provinces did increase during the currency of
the softwood lumber agreement.
It appears that we are headed in that kind of direction again as the Cana-
dian coalition has moved to exclude, one way or another, the Maritime Prov-
inces from the Countervailing Duty (CVD) investigation.
My question is are we losing sight of a fundamental question? Are we by
engaging in this debate that we are in right now in this room losing sight of
the fundamental problem? Is it so that stumpage rates, which are too low, are
necessarily a subsidy? I hope we are not losing sight of that fundamental
question. Why should not a province be able to charge just whatever it likes
for the right to cut wood and to look after the forest lands and the roads in the
way the province wants? Why is a stumpage rate necessarily a subsidy if it is
by some calculation "too low"?
Is not there a fundamental question there that we are forgetting?
ANSWER, MR. MACH: First of all, with respect to the issue of cover-
age, I was going through my presentation as quickly as I could. I apologize
for not making all the references clear, that most of these actions were di-
rected at four provinces, Ontario, Alberta, Quebec and British Columbia. I
mentioned that those provinces were mentioned in the negotiations. The
other provinces have not been covered in the investigations or agreements for
various reasons.
The reference was made earlier by Ms. Anderson about the necessity to
not negotiate as individual provinces that this is a difficulty in terms of bring-
ing about a resolution.
I guess one comment I would like to add here, is that the interests of the
province are very, very diverse, and you have a situation, where because of
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the structure and the ownership of forest lands of those provinces, they feel
they are in a situation of being able to demonstrate easily under U.S. law
there is no subsidization; and, therefore, they should be excluded from any
countervailing duty, as well as, therefore, being excluded from any negoti-
ated resolution.
You have other provinces, such as Ontario and Alberta where, certainly,
we would not like to see a countervailing duty implied on our softwood lum-
ber industry, but, in terms of the impact on are overall economy, it is rela-
tively small. Alberta's exports are approximately fifty- five billion dollars.
Our softwood lumber exports account for about six hundred million of that.
It is not if there would be a phenomenally drastic affect on the Alberta
economy of a duty on exports.
Certainly, with what we heard with respect to Ontario and its manufactur-
ing situation, its level of exports of softwood lumber products of the province
overall is not that significantly effected either.
However, you look at British Columbia, where the forest base is such a
large component of its overall gross domestic product and employment, and
you have a situation of suggesting to British Columbia that they should do
nothing but fight a countervailing duty action, and accept whatever counter-
vailing duty comes out of the other end, which may mean from their perspec-
tive a transfer of funds between six hundred million dollars and one billion
dollars a year that could go into their treasury instead of going to the U.S.
Treasury. That puts a different perspective on whether or not there is desire
to negotiate a resolution.
So, you know, it would be very nice if we all had identical interests and
consequences that would facilitate a complete consensus in Canada, but, as I
mentioned before, just in dealing with something on the softwood lumber
agreement, there is not a consensus in Canada, and that is because of the
dramatically different impacts of both the agreement and the effects of the
countervailing duty rate.
With respect to the comment about stumpage rates, I guess we certainly
agree. From our perspective, the stumpage rates are not a countervailable
subsidy. That is what we are trying to prove through all the various proce-
dures. That is what we thought we had won with the Countervail 3. How-
ever, as I said, there has not been that fifth state of resolution, which has been
acceptance on the part of the United States of that concept.
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: I would add, certainly, I do not think that
a stumpage rate that is not negative is a countervailable subsidy because I do
not think it fits the definition in the subsidies agreement, which has been
incorporated into U.S. law. I think that will get fought out in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) because the U.S. will not decide and accept that.
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COMMENT, MR. HERMAN: The interesting thing in this case, unlike
the previous softwood cases, is that WTO is the Court of last resort. It was
not in previous cases. I think that changes the landscape significantly.
QUESTION, MR. ROBINSON: This is a technical question.
Can you tell us what the changes in U.S. Countervailing Ad- Valorem
Duty (AVD) laws between Softwood 3 and 4 have been? We keep reading
in the paper there have been changes in the law that make it easier for the
U.S. to make this case out. I am not sure what they are.
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: You are going to be sorry you asked this
question. The short answer is there is a provision in the Uruguay Rounds
Agreement Act, the countervail duty law, and the U.S. statute implementing
the WTO Agreements that says the Commerce Department does not have to
determine or does not have to look at the effects of subsidy to determine that
there is a subsidy. I mean that is not the language, but the idea was they do
not have to look at whether the subsidy had an effect on the price or output of
the product under investigation to determine that it was a subsidy. This is a
consequence of an argument that Canada made and won in the NAFTA Panel
in Lumber 3, and it actually goes back to the stumpage subsidy in the first
place, because we had shown through economic theory and empirical evi-
dence that the rate of stumpage, as long as it was not negative or a change in
that rate, wasn't going to effect the price or output of a log, or effect the price
or output of softwood lumber. If it does not affect the price or output of a
log, then it is not a subsidy to lumber.
They kind of got it wrong in the U.S. statute. We will see what happens.
QUESTION, MR. ELGIE: I am certainly not someone who favors U.S.
trade sanctions against the Canadian timber industry, but we are probably
getting a short shift on the U.S. side on this position.
It strikes me without wanting to unpack all of the subsidy issues, because
I know stumpage and log export are complex issues, there is some validity to
some of the arguments that we hear from the U.S. side in favor of subsidy.
Let me throw out two or three from British Columbia that I am familiar
with and get your reaction to it.
One of them is, one that my organization unwittingly brought up and
found itself in the middle of, the softwood lumber dispute, and stumpage
price shaving in British Columbia. A practice where stumpage prices are set
typically in the first year of an agreement, and they are based on the value or
the average value of the timber logged in your tree farm license area in that
first year. What is happening in British Columbia is often they have a prac-
tice of cutting only the low value timber in the first year, and cutting it at low
levels to set the stumpage rate very low, and after a year cut the heck out of
it, taking all the high timber value and save millions and millions. We actu-
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ally released a report after a year's investigation on this. The British Colum-
bia Government initially denied it; then said, "Yes, you are right." We lose
millions and millions a year in stumpage. Little did we know that would
ends up as an exhibit to the U.S. softwood lumber dispute.
An environmental example is endangered species protection. Producers in
the U.S. Pacific Northwest have had to dramatically curtail logging on Fed-
eral lands and some states and private lands to protect spotted owls, grizzly
bears, salmon, and other listed species. What you saw is the amount of log-
ging levels that went down in the U.S. northwest forests went up by almost
the same level in British Columbia after that endangered species act went in,
and exports back to the U.S. went up by that same level.
In other words, because of the Canadian timber industry in British Co-
lumbia does not have an Endangered Species Act and was able to continue
logging in the habitat of all these same species that the U.S. industry could
not log in, they effectively did gain an advantage, a competitive advantage in
a very real sense. British Columbia's industry acknowledges, and when you
look at the long terms sustainable yield of timber logged in British Columbia,
they are logging at twenty percent above the level that is sustainable in the
long term; and Alberta does not do that, so that is probably not a fair com-
ment to you, but British Columbia does not log at levels that are sustainable
in the long term. Both of those are widely accepted international principles
that one should protect endangered species and one logs at sustainable levels.
Canada's industry is not doing it. There is also the stumpage shaving issues.
That may explain to some extent why some U.S. environmental groups
are joining in this debate saying there are some environmental aspects about
which we have some concerns.
What do you think of those?
ANSWER, MS. ANDERSON: Number one, I think, and this is me
speaking, I think that environmentalists ought to be concerned about what
happens in the forest, whether it is in the U.S., Canada, Brazil, wherever
there is a forest, we ought to be concerned about it. That is my environmen-
talism. I think it is very dangerous to accept without an incredible amount of
research behind the numbers and the allegations.
The information that might be put forward by a contingent of U.S. indus-
try that wants protection against imports, I would look at their information
and their statistics with a great deal of suspicion. To respond to the first
point you made concerning the British Columbia forest management system.
There has been a lot of publicity and controversy over rate setting.
I think the rate setting issue is surely a regulatory setting for British Co-
lumbia officials. I know they have been looking at it. I do not think that by
itself is a subsidy.
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This is not worth bringing a huge trade dispute over. It is worth fixing
the regulatory problem, but if it is that, it is not a major bilateral trade dis-
pute. I do not argue they do not have to look at it as a regulatory basis. It
was rate setting.
COMMENT, MR. ELGIE: It is pretty clear, actually, that British Co-
lumbia exports and logging rates went up about the same time as the U.S.
Endangered Species Act brought down the logging level of the U.S Pacific
northwest. In other words, the things the U.S. industry could not do on their
side, the British Columbia industry benefited and picked up the slack in the
form of increased exports to the U.S. to fill that need.
COMMENT, MS. ANDERSON: Put another way, the U.S. Pacific
Northwest has an increased supply problem because, in part, of restrictions
on logging because of environmental issues. That is true. It is not necessarily
a bad thing that the British Columbia industry could sell more lumber into
the U.S. to fill U.S. demand. I mean the U.S. cannot meet it's own demand
period. It only meets two thirds of it.
MR. HERMAN: I would like to ask everybody to join with me and thank
both Mr. Mach and' Ms. Anderson.
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